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THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF NEW MEXICO
1821-1852

By SISTER MARY LOYOLA, S.H.N., PH.D.
CHAPTER III
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN NEW MEXICO
UR~NG

the years of turmoil following Mexico's declaration of independence from Spain, many complaints
made to their home governmen'ts by foreigners
residing in the country because of Mexico's inability to protect them and their business interests. For twenty years
before the outbreak of the war between the United States
and Mexico, the question of the claims of American merchants who demanded restitution for alleged confiscation of
property constituted one of the most important points of
controversy between the two nations. As in all such cases,
there can be no doubt that some of the claims were largely
fictitious or highly exaggerated.!
The Texas question, on which the leaders of thought in
the United States were divided into two hostile camps, ultimately became inextricably bound up with this matter.
Any attempt at the adjustment of the various problems involvedseemed, to the enemies of the successive administrations, a ·furtive attempt to obtain possession of western
domain which would serve as a stepping-stone to the Pacific
and increase slave territory.
. Initial Attempt to Acquire Mexican Territory. Foundation for such attacks was. found in the instructions to successive ministers to Mexico beginning with Butler in 1829. He
was personally instructed by President Jackson to use his
utmost endeavors to purchase Texas. This was but a repetition of the instructions which Van Buren, as Secretary of
State, had drawn up for Poinsett, the previous minister to

D
were

1. Kohl, c. c., ClaimB aB a CaUBe of the Me.,ican War VII, 78; Maning, W. R.,
Early Diplomatic Relations between the United State. and Mexico, 252-276.
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Mexico, wherein great stress was laid on the advantage
which would accrue to Mexico by her cession of a portion
of the territory of Texas for a pecuniary consideration; and
Mr. Poinsett was urged to spare no effort to have the
boundary settled according to instructions, since this alone
would insure to the citizens of the United States the undisputed navigation of the Mississippi. 2 This message had not
been sent to Poinsett because of his recall.
Butler did not succeed in accomplishing anything, and
was recalled in 1835 because of complaints made by Mexico
to the United States in regard to his conduct. Powhatan
Ellis was appointed to fill his place as charge d'affaires. In
1836, Forsyth, Secretary of State, wrote to Ellis:
The claims of citizens of the United States
on the Mexican Government for injuries to their
persons or property by the authorities or citizens
of that republic are numerous and of considerable amount, and though many of them are of long
standing, provision for their payment is pertinaciously withheld, and the justice of most of them
has not been acknowledged. 3
At Ellis' suggestions a more vigorous policy was determined upon. In a dispatch from Mr. Forsyth, the grievances against Mexico were reviewed, aI].d Ellis was instructed
to demand his passports if satisfactory investigation and
reparation were not undertaken without undue delay. Thus
diplomatic relations would be severed.4 Ellis followed the
letter of his instructions and, not receiving a satisfactory
reply, demanded his passports, Dec. 13, 1836. 5
The Gaines-Gorostiza Episode. Matters were also approaching a crisis in the United States, but on wholly different grounds. Texas, having declared her independence of
Mexico, was anxiously seeking recognition and annexation
by the pnited States. Her ministers had aroused enthusi2.
3.
4.
5.

House Ex. Doc. 42, 25 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 10-16.
House Ex. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 Sess., XII, p. 160.
House Ex. Doc. 105, 25 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 24-27.
Ibid. 51.
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astic interest among our citizens, although the officials hesitate<;l to take a decisive step.6
On January 23, 1836,. President Jackson, through Secretary. of War, Lewis Cass, instructed General Gaines to
advance to the western frontier of Louisiana to prevent
Indian depredations and the crossing of the boundary by
armed contestants who had already taken or might take
part in the conflict between Texas and Mexico. A later
note gave instructions not to advance beyond Nacogdoches. 7
Gorostiza, the Mexican minister to the United States,
entered a protest against the order and requested that it be
revoked as a violation of neutrality, since there could be no
doubt that the region referred to lay within the boundaries
of Mexico. s In reply, Forsyth represented that since the
treaty of limits had not yet been drawn up there could be
no definite decision as to where the true boundary lay. He
stated:
... The troops of General Gaines will be employed
only in protecting the interests of the United States
and those of the Mexican territory according to the
obligations of the treaty between the two powers.
Whether the territory beyond the United States
belongs to the Mexican Government or the newly
declared Texan State is a question into which the
United States does not propose to enter. 9
A lengthy correspondence was carried on between
Gorostiza and Forsyth in which Gorostiza endeavored to
have the instructions countermanded and Forsyth held to
the view that the authority given to General Gaines was in
full accord with former treaties, and that the Mexican
official had no reason to fear that an attempt would be made
later to base any claims on the occupation of the region;
that
6.
Amer.
7.
8.
Cong.,
9.

Garrison~ "Texan Diplomatic Correspondence." in Annual Report of the
Hist. Asso. 1907, vol. 2,' passim; House Ex. Doc., 256, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., passim.
House Ex. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., VI, pp. 40 et seq.
House Ex. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., VI, PP. 15-26; House Ex. Doc. 2, 24
2 Sess., p. 27.
House Ex. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., VI, p. 32.
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... the orders. given to General Gaines· were not
given because the United States believed they had
claims to the territory beyond Nacogdoches, nor
with a view to assert, strengthen, or maintain those
claims, but simply and exclusively to prevent consequences likely to grow out of the bloody contest
begun in that quarter. 10
Notwithstanding such assurances, it is not surprising,
when one reads some of the communications from Gaines of
which the following is typical, that Gorostiza was not entirely convincedBelieving it to be of great importance to our
country, as well as to Texas and Mexico, and indeed
to the whole people of the continent of America,
that our Government should be prepared to act
promptly upon the anticipated application of the
people of Texas for admission; and desiring, as
fervently as anyone of the early friends of the
President can possibly desire, that this magnificent acquisition to our Union should be made
within the period of his presidential term, and
apprehending that unlooked for changes and embarrassing interference by foreign Powers might
result from delaying our national action upon the
subjectto another session of Congress, I have taken
leave to order to the city of Washington Captain
E .. A. Hitchcock . . . whose discriminating mind
and perfect integrity 3nd honor will enable him to
communicate more fully than my present -delicate
health . . . will allow me to write, the facts and
circumstances connected with this interesting subject, the opinions and wishes of the inhabitants of
the eastern border of Texas, together with the late
occurrences, and present state of my command.l l
The continued reports of the passage of armed forces
from the United States to Texas, and the apparent negligence of the United States in preventing these movements,
together with the activities of Gaines, were noted carefully
10. House Eir;. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 Bess., P. 256.
11. Gaines to Cass, May 10, 1836, House E",. Doc. 25 Cong., 2 Bess., XII, Doc.
351, PP. 786-787; Marshall, T. M., A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisi.
ana Purchase. 1819-1841, p. 171.
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by Gorostiza and drew forth numerous complaints from
him during the year 1836.J2 In the latter part of 1836, he
indignantly terminated his mission to the United States.
Before leaving, he published a pamphlet setting forth the
reasons for his action and bitterly complaining of the attitude taken by the United States in the Texas question. This
was considered defamatory to the United States as well as·
a violation of the laws of diplomacy. A note was immediately sent to Mr. Ellis informing him of the affair and ordering him to break off diplomatic relations unless the Mexican
Government disavowed the act of its minister,13 . This order
did not reach Ellis until he had already demanded his passports for the reasons stated above. Thus diplomatic relations between· the two countries were severed almost simultaneously in the two capitals at the close of 1836.
To the country at large war seemed imminent; but
among the officials of government the matter was not considered very serious. It was determined that one more
demand should be made upon Mexico for a settlement of
claims. 14 The demand was sent shortly after the accession
of Van Buren to the presidency.
The opposition party in Congress used the entire episode as capital for attacks on the government. Adams made
his famous speech in the House, in which the entire policy of
the government of the United States toward Mexico was
reviewed. He declared:
From the battle of San Jacinto, every movement of the Administration of the Union appears
to have been made for the express purpose of
breaking off negotiations and precipitating a war
or of frightening Mexico by menaces into· cession
of not only Texas but of the whole course of the
Rio del Norte, and five degrees of latitude across
the continent to the South Sea.l5
12. HO'UlIe Eo:. Doc., 2, 24 Cong., 2 Sess., passim. See Marshall, 186 et 8eq.
13. House Eo:. Doc. 105, 24 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 47-50.
14. Congressional Gwbe, 24 Cong., 2 Sess. IV, .p. 193.
15. Adams, J. Q., Speech on the Right of Petition, Freedom of Speech and
Debate, etc., delivered in the House from June 16 to July 7, 1898.
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This speech gave excellent material for agitation to Mexico
and the anti-slavery interest in the United States.
A careful study of the documents shows that Adams'
anti-slavery proclivities, which made him read into official
acts a determination to extend the slave area by fair means
or foul, greatly distorted his perspective. Jackson was
certainly eager to acquire Texas; but it cannot be shown
that he stooped to any under-handed measures. The same
can be said -of Van Buren. Reeves states:
Jackson's and Van Burean's attitude toward
Texan annexation was cautious, prudent, and
founded on just principles. That the tone adopted
toward Mexico upon the subject of claims was
severe does not thereby convict Jackson and Van
Buren of duplicity or hypocrisy or shamelessness.
. . . Instead of using the Mexican claims as a cloak
for war by which annexation might be accomplished, the reverse may be stated as the truth.
The open refusal of the United States to accept the
Texan offer of annexation put the United States
in a position where demand for payment of its
claims upon Mexico could be made without any suspicion of ulterior motive. 16

Arbitration of Claims. On September 11, 1838, arbitration of the claims was agreed upon and all danger of
war was over. Diplomatic relations were at once re-established. After soine delay in preliminary arrangements, the
board began its work at Washington on December 29,
1840. 17 Two commissioners had been appointed for each
side and the, KIng of Prussia through a delegate, Baron
Roenne, then minister resident of Prussia at Washington,
acted as umpire. In the eighteen months (August 184016. Reeves, J. R., American Dip!mnacy under Tyler and Polk, 84-86. Kohl,
Claims as a Cause of the Mexican War, 30-44.
17. The convention signed in 1838 was not carried into effect because of Mexico's
failure to authorize the exchange of ratifications within the time prescribed. The
delay was said to be due to the fact that the King of Prussia had not consented to
appo~nt an umpire as had been provided by the terms of the convention.
A second
convention was concluded in April, 1839. (Moore, J. B., International Arbitrations,
II, 1218).
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February, 1842) allowed by the terms of the convention
eighty-four claims had been presented and of these thirty
had not been finally decided. Every evidence goes to prove
the sincerity of the Mexican commissioners and their earnest efforts to adjudicate the claims according to strict justice. The amount allowed, approximately thirty per cent
of the claims, was a very large proportion for such cases,
and the Mexican' delegates declared that failure to settle
more claims was due to the tardiness with which the claimants presented their cases. 18
The poverty of the Mexican treasury at the time rendered it impossible to pay the indemnity agreed upon., This
necessitated another convention which was concluded at the
city of Mexico in 1843. It was therein provided that the
Mexican government should "on the thirtieth of the following April pay all interest then due on the awards, and within
five years from that day, in equal installments every three
months, all the principal and accruing interest."
18.
table:

An idea of the work of the commission may be gained from the following

Amount
Amount of claims decided by the board without reference to the umpire
Amount claimed
$595,462.75
Amount allowed
439,393.82
Rejected on their merits at the board
Amount claimed '_________________________________________________

51,492.25

Decided by the 'board not to be within the convention
Amount claimed -------------------------c----------------------9,278.26
Claims on which the board differed which were reported to the umpire
for, deciBion~ and on which allowance was made
Amount claimed
--------------------------------------_-- 5,844,260.44
Amount allowed by American commis.
2,334,477.44
Amount allowed by Mexican commisso
---------- 191,012.94
Amount allowed by the umpire
---------- 1,586,745.86
Rejected by the umpire on the merits
Amount claimed
59,967.40
Amount .claimed by American commissioners
~________________
57~754A2
Decided by the umpire not to be within the cognizance of the board
Amount claimed
.,
1,864,939.56
Amount allowed by American commissioners
928;627.88
Cases submitted too late to be considered by the board
'
Amount claimed
,3,336,837.05
Total awarded by the umpire
---------$1,586,745.'86
Total awarded by the American, commissioners on reference to the umpire 2,334,477.44
Total awarded by the Mexican commissioners on reference to the umpire 191,012.94
(Moore, op. cit., II, 1232.)
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In April, 1844, the Mexican government ceased to pay
installments. There was no money in the Mexican treasury,
although the government had gone to the extent of demanding a forced loan with which to meet its obligations. Shortly
after, a revolution caused the permanent cessation of all
payments.19 Again the diplomatic sky looked threatening;
the storm was brewing in another quarter also.
The Texas Question. The question of Texan annexation was to furnish the basis of renewed difficulties with
Mexico. Tyler came to the presidency determined on expansion; Was not expansion a necessity, if anything was to
be accomplished in regard to the proposed opening of trade
with China, and the establishment of a consul at the Sandwich Islands ?20 Within a few days after taking the oath of
office, the President referred to annexation as the all important measure of his administration. 21
In January, 1843, Mr. Thompson, the American minister to Mexico, was instructed to remonstrate against th~
mode of warfare which was being carried on against Texas,
and to make it clear that if Texas were not either reconquered by Mexico, according to the regular mode of warfare
by a sufficiently strong force, or else her independence recognized by Mexico, the United States would show her disapproval in a more forcible manner. 22
The attitude adopted by Tyler is excellently summed up
by Kohl in the statement: "Tyler's first plan for securing
'territory appears to have been one which very few at that
time knew anything about. This was to trade the claims for
Texas and California. Thompson's ,first dispatch to Washington, dated April 29, 1842, went aside from the main subject with which it dealt to discuss the question of acquiring
territory. He declared:
19. Moore, J. B., Internatio7W.l Arbitrations, II, 1216-1248. (Ho. Mis. Doc. 63
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 212, II, 3267). The matter was finally settled by the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo by which the United States assumed these obligations of Mexico.
20. For this interesting aspect of western extension see Lyon G. Tyler, The
Letter8 and TVme8 of The Tyler8 II, 262.
21. Ibid., 264.
22. Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., 69-70.
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I believe that this Government would cede to
us Texas and the Californias, and I am thoroughly
satisfied that it is all we shall ever get for the
claims of our merchants on this country. As to
Texas, I regard it as of little value compared with
California-the richest, the most beautiful and the
,healthiest country in the world .. , In addition to
which California is destined to be the' granary of
the Pacific. It is a country in which slavery is not
necessary and therefore if that is made an objection, let there be another compromise. 'France
and England both have had their eyes upon it ...
If I could mingle any selfish feelings with interests
to my country so 'vast, I would desire no higher
honor than to be an instrument in securing it. 23
Later dispatches reveal the anxiety of Thompson to see the
matt.er_favorably adjusted.
enmity aroused in Mexico by the evident sympathy of Americans with the Texans, together with the
foolish act of Commodore Jones of the Pacific Squadron
in taking possession of MontereY,24 made impossible the
acquisition of territory in exchange for claims; and Tyler
did not intend to go to war for such a cause.
Agitation throughout the country continued, howeT.::i, .
and during the last months of Tyler's administration official notice was given by the Mexican minister, Almonte,
that the annexation of Texas by the United States would
be considered as equivalent to a declaration of war, and in
such an event he would consider his mission to the United
States ended, since on receipt of the news of such an act;
Mexico would immediately declare war. 25
The stand was at once taken in Washington that the
declaration of war by Mexico, if Texas were annexed, would
be entirely uncalled for, since Texas had maintained her
independence for eight years, and the inability of Mexico

<'Tne

.23. Ms. Archives, Dept. of State. Dispatches from Agents in Mexico as cited in
Kohl, Claims as a Cause of the Mexican War; 46.
'
24. For an account of the episode see House Ex. Doc. 166, 27 Cong., 3 Sess.,
j)assim.
25. House Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 39 et seq.
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to reconquer her during all that time made it impossible
for the United States to consider her longer a part of
Mexico. 26
In the closing months of his administration, Tyler
strove earnestly to have the Treaty of Annexation completed and had the satisfaction of seeing this done on March
3, 1845, one day before his authority ceased, although the
full ratification took place only in December, 1845, under
the Polk administration. As threatened, the Mexican minister at once withdrew from Washington; and thus diplomatic relations which had so recently been restored were
once more severed. 27
Expansionist Plans of Polk. Polk, the successor of
Tyler in the presidential office, showed, from the outset of
his term, a great desire for expansion. He determined to
.attempt to re-establish amicable relations with Mexico for
this purpose. Mr. Parrott was sent to determine whether
or not Mexico was willing to renew diplomatic intercourse.
Polk records in his diary:
He, Parrott, is of the opinion that the government is desirous to re-establish diplomatic relations with the United States and that a minister
from the United States would be received ... After
much consultation, in full Cabinet, it. was agreed
unanimously that it was expedient to reopen diplomatic relations with Mexico, but that it was to
be kept a profound secret that such a step was contemplated. 28
The secrecy was due to fear of foreign interference. It was
determined to appoint to the difficult office Mr. Slidell who
seemed well qualified for the task. Before sending Slidell,
assurance was procured from the Mexican Minister of Foreign affairs that Mexico would receive a Commissioner
having full power to settle the Texas dispute. 29
26. Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 87.
27. For a detailed discussion of Annexation see McCormac, E. 1.. James K. Polk.
a Political BiogralJhy, 352-72.
28. Polle, Diary, Sept. 16, 1845.
29. House Ere. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, pp. 13-17.
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Although an important question to be settled was that
of the boundary of Texas, the anxiety and hope of the
Government to obtain possession of New Mexico and .California are revealed in the specific instructions to Slidell
upon the subject. The whole question of claims was reviewed at great length and the following conclusion reached:
The result of the whole is, that the injuries
and outrages committed by the authorities of
Mexico on American citizens, which, in the opinion of President Jackson, would so long. ago as
February, 1837, have justified a resort to war or
reprisals for redress, yet remain wholly unredeemed excepting only the comparatively small
amount received under the convention of· April,
1839.
. . . The fact is but too well known. to the
world that the Mexican government is not now in
a condition to satisfy these claims by the payment
of money. Unless the debt should be assumed by
the government of the United States, the claimants cannot receive what is justly their due. Fortunately the joint resolution of Congress, approved
1st. March, 1845, for annexing Texas to the United
States, presents the means of satisfying these
claims, in perfect consistency with the interests as
well as the honor of both republics. It has reserved
to this government the adjustment of all questions
of boundary that may arise with other governments. This question of boundary may, therefore,
be adjusted in such a manner between the two
republics as to cast the burden of the debt due to
American claimants upon their own government
whilst it will do no injury to Mexico.
There follows a detailed discussion of the question of
the Texas boundary, and then the interest in New Mexico
asserts itself. The instructions continue:
The long and narrow valley of New Mexico,
or Santa Fe, is situated on both banks of the upper
Del Norte, and is bounded on both sides by mountains. It is many hundred miles remote from other
settled portions of Mexico, and from its distance
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it is both difficult and expensive to defend the inhabitants against the tribes of fierce and warlike
savages, that roam over the surrounding country.
For this cause it has suffered severely from their
incursions. Mexico must expend far more in defending so distant 'a possession, than she can possibly derive benefit from continuing to hold it.
Besides it is greatly to be desired that our
boundary with Mexico should now be established
in such a manner as to preclude all future difficulties and disputes between the two republics. A great
portion of New Mexico being on this side .of the
Rio Grande, and included within the limits already
claimed by Texas, it may hereafter, should it remain a Mexican province, become a subject of dispute and a source of bad feeling between those,
who, I trust are destined in future to be always
friends.
On the other hand, if, in adjusting the boundary, the province of New Mexico should be included within the limits of the United States, this
would obviate the danger of future collisions.
Mexico would part with a remote and detached
province, the possession of which can never be advantageous to her; and she would be relieved from
the trouble and expense of defending its inhabitants against the Indians.. Besides she would thus
purchase security against their attacks on her other
provinces west of the Del Norte as it would at once
become the duty of the United States to restrain
the savage tribes· within their limits, and prevent
them from making hostile incursions into Mexico
From these considerations, and others which will
readily suggest themselves to your mind, it would
seem to be equally the interest of both powers that
New Mexico should belong to the United States. so
Slidell was instructed to offer a sufficiently large sum
of money to compensate Mexico for this cession. Fear was
expressed that Mexico might be contemplating the sale of
California to England, and we read:
The possession of the bay and harbor of San
Francisco is all important to the United States.
SO.

Ho. E",. Doc. 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 87.40.
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The advantages to us of its acquisition are so
striking that it would be a waste of time to enumerate them here. If all these should be turned
against our country by the cession of California to
Great Britain, our principal commercial rival, the
consequences would be most disastrous.
The government of California is now but
nominally dependent upon Mexico, and it is more
than doubtful whether her authority will ever be
reinstated. Under these circumstances, it is the
desire of the President that you should use your
best efforts to obtain the cession of that province
from Mexico to the United· States. Could you accomplish this object you would render immense
service to your country and establish an enviable
reputation for yourself. Money would be no object
when compared with the value of the acquisition
. . . Should you, after sounding the Mexican
authorities on the· subject, discover a prospect
of success, the President would not hesitate to
give, in addition to the assumption of the just
claims of our citizens on Mexico, $25,000,000 for
the cession. 31
But such roseate dreams were destined to come to
naught, for the United States, with her usual promptness,
complied so quickly with the permission to send a minister,
that Slidell reached Mexico before President Herrera had
an opportunity to prepare the minds of the Mexican people
for the restoration of friendly relations with the United
States. The civil war which was brewing threatened the
Herrera administration, and it was felt that the reception
of Slidell would precipitate the dreaded disruption. 32 Events
proved the instability of the President's power and ·justification of his fears .
The' fact that, contrary to the agreement of Mexico,
Slidell had been commissioned as minister plenipotentiary
with power and instructions to negotiate matters other than
the Texas boundary dispute and that his appointment had
.

31.
32.

1

Ho. Eo:. Doc. 69, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 41.
Brooks, N. C., Complete HistoTjJ of the Meo:ican War, 60.
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not been confirmed by the Senate, was seized upon as an
excuse for refusing to receive him. 33 The action of the
United States in this matter raised a storm of protest among
the Mexican patriots who saw herein the attempt of a powerful nation to take advantage of a weak neighbor and,
under the guise of friendship, deprive her of her fairest
provinces. The well formulated arguments did not appeal
to them.
Reports from Slidell made it seem certain that he would
not be received by the Mexican Government. On January
13, 1846, Polk ordered the United States' troops to advance
to the Rio Grande presumably for the purpose of protecting Texas. 34 The army left Corpus Christi and reached
Point Isabel on the twenty-fourth. 35 These war-like preparations could leave no doubt as to the determination of the
United States to reach a solution of the difficulties that had
so long existed between the two countries. On March 12,
1846, Slidell received a decided refusal from the newly
formed Mexican Government, under Paredes, to receive
him. Great indignation was expresesd in Mexico because
of the hostile attitude assumed by the United States at the
time when, presumably, it was seeking are-establishment
of diplomatic relations. 36 American writers who have
studied the matter seriously have expressed divergent
opinions on the Slidell mission. J. S. Reeves states:
Parrott's mission and Slidell's instructions
taken together prove two things .(1) that the
Mexican War was not the result of the annexation
of Texas, and (2) that the reopening of diplomatic
relations with Mexico was for the purpose of securing' California by purchase . .. The President
developed a plan by which he believed that expansion could be effected by peaceful means. Claims
against Mexico under discussion as far back as
Jackson's time furnished the groundwork of the
33.
34.
35.
36.

Bo. E",. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 Sess. VII, Pp. 23-31.
McCormac, op. cit., 375.
Garrison, G. P., Westward Extension, 222.
Bo. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, pp. 67 et seq.
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plan; the joint resolution of annexing Texas gave
the President something to build upon. Mexico
could not pay the claims in cash; the Texan boundary was unsettled. The idea of territorial indemnity was an irresistable conclusion: let her pay in
land. 37
Failure of Diplomacy. On the reception of the news of
Slidell's rejection, Polk suggested to his cabinet that a more
decisive attitude be adopted toward Mexico. 3s The Oregon
question then under discussion caused hesitation until Saturday, May 9, when, as Polk records in his diary, it was
unanimously agreed that if any" act of hostility were committed by the Mexican forces against General Taylor's
forces, he should immediately recommend to Congress a
declaration of war. He felt that sufficient cause had already
been given, and that without waiting for further provocation, he should recommend the declaration of war on the
following Tuesday. All agreed to this except Mr. Bancroft,
the Secretary of the Navy, who held that war should be
declared only on the commission of a definite act of hostility
by the Mexican forces. 39
Before the day was over a report of an opportune "act
of hostility" was received from General Taylor giving
account of the well known episode of the attack by the Mexican forces on the detachment of Taylor's troops on the easterri bank of the Rio Grande. Monday, May 11, the war message was sent to Congress, was approved, and war declared
on the next day. Diplomatic efforts, of more or less sincerity, had failed. The appeal to arms was resorted to. The
keynote words of Polk's message soon resounded far and
wide. "... Mexico has shed American blood on American
soil."40
Polk assumed much in proclaiming that the Mexican
forces had entered within American territory. That he hon37. Reeves, J. S., American Dipwmacy under Tyler and Polk, 275.
by McCormac, op. cit., p. 391.
8S". Polk, Diary, Apr. 115,1846.
39. Ibid., May 9, 1846.
40. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 487.

See comment
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estly considered the Rio Grande as the boundary of Mexico,
is doubtfuI.41 Senator Benton in reviewing this affair remarks. "The march to the Rio Grande brought on the collision .of arms, but so far from being the cause of the war,
it was itself the effect of these causes,"42
It would take .us too far afield to enter even a brief discussion of the various causes of the Mexican war. It cannot
be doubted that the question of claims is a factor to be reckoned with, but as Kohl says: "Had it not been for the ideals
of expansion the claims would have been far too insignificant for notice and the Mexican War would probably have
never been fought. As it was, the claims remained a constant grievance against Mexico down to the time of Polk;
and he used them as a pretext, not a cause, to get indemnity
in the form of territory."43
41. For a masterly discussion of the boundary question see. G. P. Garrison.
Te",as, pp. 262 et seq.
42. Benton. Thirty Years' View II. 639. A recent discussion of this question is
given in McCormac, op. cit.• Ch. XVII-XVIII.
43. Claims as a Cause of the Me",ican War. 79.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE MILITARY CONQUEST

Both sides entered the war with unclouded faith in
its own success, and yet neither country was in the remotest state of preparation. The activities of Generals
Scott and Taylor are generally considered the important
events of the conflict. This is doubtless trile from the standpoint of military achievement, but the success of the "Army
of the West" under General Kearny was of prime strategic
significance. This detachment was apparently watched
with keen interest by the administration. During the earliest discussions with the Secretary of War and General
Scott, Polk gave as his opinion that the first movement
should be to march a competent force into the Northern
Provinces and seize and hold them until peace was made.
All agreed in this opinion. 1
"The Army of the West." An order, dated June 3, communicated to Colonel, afterwards Brigadier-General, S. W.
Kearny, that he was appointed to take command of the
expedition destined for the conquest of Upper California.
He was ordered to take possession of Santa Fe, en route,
garrison it, and press on to California. One thousand
mounted men had been ordered to follow him in the direction of Santa Fe, and his force was also to be increased by
the incorporation of a large body of Mormons then on their
way to California for the purpose of establishing homes.
The number of the latter was to be limited to not more than
one-third of his entire force. Kearny was ordered to estab,;,
lish temporary civil governments in the places which he
should. conquer, and, as far as possible, retain in service
those who had held office under the Mexican regime and
who were willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United
States; to assure the people of the provinces that the design
of the government was to provide a free government as
soon as possible. He was warned to adopt a conciliatory
1.

Polk. Diarv, May 14. 181,6.
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attitude in every possible respect and that trade with the
United States was not to be interrupted under the changed
conditions. 2
Kearny's army, as ordered to rendezvous at Fort Leavenworth, twenty-two miles above the mouth of the Kansas,
comprised 1,658 men-two batteries of artillery under
Major Clark, three squadrons of the First Dragoons under
Major Sumner, the first regiment of Missouri cavalry under
Colonel Doniphan, and two companies of infantry under
Captain Agney. The various detachments came together,
however, only a short distance from Bent's Fort, near the
present village of Las Animas. Here they found 414 loaded
wagons of the Santa Fe Trade awaiting protection. 3
When news reached Santa Fe that the American army
was encamped at Bent's Fort, a meeting of the principal
citizens was called for the purpose of discussing the most
effective measures to be taken. Opinions differed, some preferred to surrender without resistance; others insisted that
a stand should be made against the enemy. The latter ruled.
General Armijo, assisted by Pino and Baca, was entrusted
with the defense. General Armijo only reluctantly approved
of the plans and issued a proclamation calling upon the
people of New Mexico to assist in the preservation of the
Mexican State. 4
In words of staunch loyalty which later acts contradicted, he appealed to their patriotism and loyalty, recalling the recent formation of the Republic. One paragraph
is quite indicative of the whole: "The eagle that summoned
you 'at Iguala under the national standard forming a single
family out of us ail, with one single will, calls on you today
to gather around the supreme government . . . You then
could conquer without external help, led only by your noble
efforts and heroic patriotism, the independence of our
2. Sec. of War, W. L. Marcy to Gen. Kearny June 3, 1846. House Ex. Doc. 60,
30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 153; also House Ex. Doc. 17, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., PP. 236-239.
3. Emory, W. H. Notes of a Military Reconnaissance, 14. (Ho. Ex. Doc. 41, 30
Cong., 1 Sess.) ; Prince, Concise History' of New Mexico, 178.
4. Proclamation in B. M. Read Collection, D. No. ,20.
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nation ... Today that sacred boon, the fruit of so· many and
so costly sacrifices is threatened; for if we are not able to
preserve the integrity of our Territory, all this country
would very soon be the prey 'of the greed and enterprising
spirit of our neighbors on the north, and nothing would
remain save a sad remembrance of our political existence."5
Three days after the Army of the West arrived at the
Fort, Kearny dispatched Captain Cooke with twelve picked
men, accompanied by James Magoffin of Kentucky, formerly American Consul in Chihuahua, and Senor Gonzales
of Chihuahua, who were engaged in the caravan trade,
with a flag of truce to Santa Fe, two hundred miles distant,6
Senator Benton has written, in his Thirty Years' View,
an account of the conquest of New Mexico in which he
offers an explanation of the remarkable success of Kearny.
He attributes the ease of the conquest to his own wisdom in
persuading James Magoffin, who was intimately acquainted
with the people and conditions in New Mexico, to join himself to Kearny's army. The President and Secretary of War
gladly accepted Magoffin's proffered services. 7 He accompanfed Captain Cooke to Santa Fe to use his power to persuade Armijo not to resist the American force. Magoffin,
it seems, obtained _this promise readily enough, but had
more difficulty in so persuading Colonel Archuleta, the second in command. According to Benton, Archuleta was won
over to the American cause by the suggestion that he take
possession for himself of the western half of New Mexico
since Kearny was only going to take possession of the left
bank of the Rio Grande. Pleased with this plan, which fell
in so well with his ambition, Archuleta consented not to
offer resistance. 8
5. Idem. See also Ritch I, 232.
6. Cooke, P. St. George, The Conquest of New Mexico and California, 6;
Twitchell. The Military Occupation of New Mexico, 376. Magoffin had been active in
the Santa Fe trade at least as early as 1839. (Ritch I, 179.)
7. Ho. Ex. Doc. 17, -31 Cong., 1 Sess., 240-241.
8. Benton, Thirty Years- View II, 683. Magoffin's services were again successful
in opening the way to Chihuahua for General Wool. Here he was suspected and imprisoned, returning to Washington only after peace was, signed.
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It is difficult to determine the actual services rendered
by Magoffin and to what extent Kearny's "bloodless conquest" was made possible by him. Benton's enmity toward
Kearny caused him to make as little as possible of Kearny's
own work, and to exaggerate that of his assistants. In
secret session of congress, Magoffin received, at Benton's
plea, $30,000. 9
"The Unbloody Conquest." The main body of the army
moved forward by way of Raton Pass. Shortly after crossing the Sapello river,1° Kearny received a· message from
Armijo stating that the people had risen en masse, but that
he would meet Kearny on the plains between the Sapello
and the Vegas.u Whether as friend or foe was not stated.
At Las Vegas was enacted a scene which was repeated
in essentials at various points within the province of New
Mexico. Kearny with his staff, riding into the public square
in the early morning, was met by the alcalde and people.
Ascending to the roof of one of the nearby adobe houses
where all could see and hear, Kearny through the interpreter, Robidoux 12 addressed the assembled multitude, an9. The Magoffin Papers in the files of the Historical Society of New Mexico are
transcripts obtained bY Mr. R. E. Twitchell of the letters written by Magoffin to
justify his claim to government remuneration. He does not hesitate to take to himself
almost compiete credit for persuading the New Mexican officials not to offer resistance.
He states: "1 certainly made no cqntract with the Government, nor did any such idea
enter my head. I engaged at the request. of President Polk to go to Mexico where
I ,had been for many years" to be of service to our troops~ . • • I went into Santa Fe
ahead of Gen'l Kearny and smoothed the way to his bloodless conquest of New Mexico.
Col. Archuletti would have fought; I quieted him. It was he who afterwards made
the revolt which was put down with much bloodshed by Gen'l Price. Fight was in
him, and it would have to come out at first, carrying A.rmiio with him if it had not
been for my exertions. . . . Bloodless possession of New Mexico was what President
Polk wished. It "Cas obtained through my means. I could state exactly how I drew
off Archuletti from his intention to fight:' The papers in which Magoffin says he
was explicit in his statement are not available. His expenditures. according to ~he
itemized list which he sent to the War Department, amounted to $37,780.96. He
states: "The above is submitted not as an account against the Unite·d States but as
data to assist in forming an· opinion of the amount that ought to be paid for my
services, by showing what they cost me; as for the services themselves they cannot be
valued in money" (Mauoffin Papers. New Mexico Historical Society.)
10. It was here that Kearny was presented with his commission as brigadiergeneral.
11. Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnaissance, Sen. Ex. Doc. 7, 30 Cong., 1
Seas., p. 25.
12. Hughes, J. T., Doniphan's Expedition, 33.
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nouncing that the American forces came by order of the
government of Washington to take possession of New Mexico and extend over it the laws of the United States; that
they came not as conquerors, but as protectors for the benefit of the people; that the authority of General Armijo had
ceased and that he himself was now the governor. He assured all who submitted peacefully to the new order of
things that they would be protected in their religion, their
persons, and their property, but that those who were found
in arms against the United States would b~ summarily punished. His words were given added weight by the presence
of the army. He then administered the oath of allegiance
and of office to the former office-holders, who accepted the
inevitable with apparently no satisfaction.13
Leaving Las'Vegas, the advance was continued with no
opposition. At Tecolote and at San Miguel, scenes similar to
that at Las Vegas were enacted. On the way thither various
persons had been met who reported that Armijo was assembling his forces, and that a vigorous resistance might be
expected at place fifteen miles from Santa Fe called the
Canon, which was being fortified. 14 At San Miguel a rumor
reached Kearny that the two thousand Mexicans assembled
in the canon to oppose his advance, had quarreled among
themselves and that Armijo had fled with his forces to the
south. The reporters said that Armijo, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, had been opposed to resistance
from the beginning. 15

a

13. Emory, OJ). cit., 27 et seq.
14. Ibid., 25.
15. Magoffin writes: "Gen. Armijo on the 15th ordered his troops, say 3,000 in
n.umber to be placed between two mountains with four pieces of artillery on the road
by which our army had to pass. . . . Armijo ..• called his officers together and wished
to know' if they were prepared to defend the territory. They answered they were not,
that they were convinced by the proclamation they had from Gen. Kearny that the
U. S. had no intention to wage war with New Mexico, on the contrary promised them
all protection in their property, person and religion. Armijo' apparently appeared
very much exasperated, gave orders to the troops to be dispersed and in 48 hours they
were all at their homes, he himself leaving for the state of Chihuahua with say 100
dragoons. . . ." (Magoffin to Sec. of War, W .. L. Marcy. Transcript in files of Historical Society of New Mexico.)
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When at a short distance from Pecos, a letter was
brought from Juan Bautista Vigil y Alarid,16 the lieutenantgovernor, informing Kearny of Armijo's flight and of Vigil's
readiness to receive him in Santa Fe and extend to him the
hospitalities of the city. The march was continued and the
entire army arrived at Santa Fe at six o'clock on August 18.
Vigil and some twenty or thirty of the people received
Kearny and his staff at the palace. At sunset, the military
salute greeted the American flag which had been hoisted
over the building,17
Kearny had fulfilled the first part of his instructions.
New Mexico, which repeated negotiation had failed to obtain, now became a part of the United States. Not a shot
had been fired. The only lives lost were those of the men
who had succumbed to the difficulties and privations of the
long rapid march.
On the following morning Kearny addressed the people
of Santa Fe in substantially the same words that he had
used in his first proclamation on Mexican soil. Vigil answered and in the name of the entire people swore obedience
and respect to the laws and authority of the United States,
since "no one in this world can successfully resist the power
of him who is stronger."18
On August 24, Kearny reported to Brigadier-General
Jones, Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, that the
official proclamation had been issued and that the people
16.

This Vigil was a cousin of the better known Donaciano Vigil of whom
Twitchell says: "Captain Vigil . . . concluded that there might be relief for his people
in the coming of the army of the United States. He naturally loved liberty for liberty's sake. He realized that the reforms under the Republic of Mexico so often
promised would never be realized. -His familiar intercourse during the generation
previous with the Santa Fe trader, with 'Americans' fresh from the 'States' doubtless
contributed to the determination of his course. . . . There is small doubt that the occupation of the Capital by General Kearny without the loss of life in bloody conflict was
largely due to the sagacious foresight and patriotic action of Captain Vigil." (The
Maitary Occupation of New Me",ico,
Donaciano Vigil was appointed Secretary of
New Mexico by Kearny (R. 1., 244).
17. Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnoissance, p. 31 et seq.
18. Viga Papers. Ms. New Mexico Historical Society, Santa Fe. Also R. I.,
242.
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of the province were quiet and could easily be kept SO.19
The days immediately follciwing were employed in
receiving delegations from the Pueblo Indians and from
Taos, in providing for the well being of the soldiers, and in
arranging for the construction of Fort Marcy, named after
the Secretary of War. This fort was situated on a hill
which commanded the entire town. It was built by the volunteers, who considered it a real hardship to be put to a
work of such a character when they had entered the army
to fight and so far had no chance to show their military
powers. It was felt, however, that this fort which when
completed could accommodate one thousand soldiers and
was armed with fourteen cannon, was extremely necessary,
since Kearny intended, according to his instructions, to
take the greater part of the army to California. 20
Rumors now r.eached Santa Fe that Armijo and Colonel
Ugarte were assembling forces in the south and marching
toward thecapitaI. Kearny, at the head of seven hundred
men, marched down the Rio Grande to Tome, one hundred
miles distance, but met with no hostile demonstrations. 21
Kearny's Code. On his return to Santa Fe Kearny, in
consonance with his instructions, appointed the civil officers,
with Charles Bent as governor. Many of those chosen had
held office under Mexican rule, but were doubtless of partial
American extraction as revealed by their names. 22 He also
19. Ho. E". Doc. 19, 29 Cong., 2 Sess.
20. Prince, L. B., History of New Me"i'Co. 299.
21. CuttS, The Ccmquest of California and New Mezico, 64.
22. "In 1853 Mr. Phelps, a member of Congress spealting of the officials of the
government set up by Kearny in place of the one he had over-thrown, said that they
were Americans residing in New Mexico. While this was true in part, ·it is likely
to create a wrong impression. They were not mere adventurers. Some of them
had resided there many years, ten or fifteen, and had become bound to the country
by marital and. other ties. This was true of the governor, Charles Bent, a native of
Virginia, who had been in New Mexico since 1832 . . . Francis P. Blair, Jr., district
attorney, was a member of'the Missouri Blair family and was afterwards p~ominent
in public life at Washington. Two members of the supreme court, Joab Houghton'
and Charles Beaubien, Were Americans, but the latter had been a resident of Taos,
~ew Mexico. since 1827, had married a native, and was widely known and respected
. . . Nearly all the others . . . Were natives, some of them memb.ers of prominent
families."
(Thomas, D. Y., A History of Military Government in Newly Acquired
Territory of the United States, 115-116.)
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announced a plan of civil government. In his report on the
laws drawn up, Kearny foregoes any credit for himself and
acknowledges that he· was entirely indebted for them to
Colonel A. W. Doniphan of the Missouri mounted 'volunteers, who was assisted by W. P. Hall of his regiment. The
laws were taken from several sources: from the laws of
Mexico, either retained in their original form or modified
to bring them into agreement with the laws of the United
States; from the laws of Texas and of Texas-Coahuila;
from the statutes of Missouri, and the Livingston Code.
The organic law was taken from the organic law of Missouri
territory.23 This code was later the subject of violent debate
in the House and was used as a weapon with which to
attack the administration on the entire subject of the war. 24
Kearny doubtless had no thought of over-stepping his instructions.
Having established order in Santa Fe, General Kearny
set out, on the twenty-fifth, for California. Colonel Doniphan was left in command of all the forces in New Mexico
with orders to march against Chihuahua on the arrival of
Colonel.Price,25 who was daily expected with his detachment
which consisted of 1,200 mounted volunteers from Missouri
and a Mormon battalion of 500 infantry which had been
organized at Council Bluffs. When, after a few days, this
new addition was made to the force already in Santa Fe,
the town was transformed into a military camp. In all,
there were now 3,500 men stationed there. 26 Doniphan
received orders from Kearny, then at La Joya, to postpone
his previously ordered march to Chihuahua and as quickly
as possible march against the Navajo Indians who were
making depredations on territory now belonging by right of
con,quest to the United States. Doniphan complied at once
and Colonel Price was left in command at Santa Fe.
23. Ho. E.,. Doc. 60, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 176.
For debate see Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., Dee. 7, 1846, PP. 38
Thomas, 106-117.
Hughes, J. T., Doniphan's E.,pedition, 51.
26. Twitchell, R. E., MilitaT1/ Occupation of New Me.,ico, 95.

24.
et seq.,
·25.
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The Revolt of 1846. When Colonel Price took over the
command, he immediately stationed the divisions of his
forces in various parts,of New Mexico as well for the good
of the men themselves, as for the preservation of order
and submission among the New Mexicans and the Pueblo
Indians. 27
Although Kearny was confident that the people of New
Mexico were satisfied with the new condition of things,
murmurs of revolt were heard almost immediately after his
departure for California and of Doniphan to the south.
.
The more influential of the Mexicans who had formerly
held.positions of honor and who now found themselves the
objects of the scorn of the invaders naturally chafed under
the new. conditions. To them, p~!'ticularly, it seemed but
patriotism to drive out those who were holding'the country
by force. 28
.
No definite benefit had, as yet, resulted from the American occupation, and the overbearing, abusive, and quarrelsome actions of the volunteers made them and the country
they represented obnoxious in the. extreme. 29 Ruxton,an
English traveler, reports, "I found over all New Mexico
that the most bitter feeling and most determined hostility
existed against the Americans who, certainly in Santa Fe
and elsewhere, have not been very anxious to conciliate the
people, but by their bullying and overbearing demeanor
toward them, have in a great measure been the cause of this
hatred." 30
Among the most prominent instigators of rebellion wa~
Diego Archuleta. It is possible, as Senator Benton suggests,
that his hostility could be traced to his disappointment in
not being allowed to control the western half of New.Mex27. Hughes, J. T., Doniphan's Expedition, 138.
28. Prince, L. B., Historical Sketches of New Mexico, 313.
29. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, 43l.
30. Ruxton, G. F., Wild Life in .tlte Rocky Mountains, 75. For a· detailed account
of the disorderly behavior of the soldiers in New Mexico see J. H. Smith, The War
with Mexico, II, pp. 216-217.
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ico according to the arrangements entered into with
Magoffin. 31
Early in December the leading citizens of Santa Fe,
following the lead of Thomas Ortiz and Archuleta, began
definitely to plan the overthrow of the government which
had been newly set up. As far as can be ascertained from
the meagre accounts which have been preserved, a general
massacre of the Americans and their Mexican supporters
was planned. The leaders dispersed to various parts of
New Mexico in order to stir up a rebellion simultaneously
in all the important outlying districts and thus insure
success. The night of Christmas eve was finally determined
upon as the most favorable time for the assault. Plans
were well laid and all seemed to promise success, but the
mulatto wife of one of the conspirators revealed the plot to
Donaciano Vigil who at once made it known to Colonel
Price, and the incipient rebellion was at once suppressed.
Many persons suspected of complicity were arrested, but
the ring-leaders escaped, notwithstanding the efforts of
Colonel Price to prevent this. 32
The Taos Rebellion. While tranquility seemed to be
restored, the agitators were not to be so easily discouraged.
Another more formidable uprising was being secretly fomented throughout the entire province. As planned, it
broke out on the nineteenth of January: Charles Bent, the
governor, was murdered at his home at Taos whither he
had gone from Santa Fe with a. small escort, refusing to
believe that his life was in any danger. Massacres of
Americans took place on the same day at the Arroyo Hondo,
Mora, and on the Colorado.
31. See above p. 76. With the unsatisfactory records which we possess in
regard to ,Magoffin, this can be only conjecture:
32. This account of the rebellion, as well as the following narrative of the
later revolt is based on the official report of Colonel Price to the Adjutant General of
the Army February 15, 1846 as given in Niles' Reaister. 72, pp. 121-2; and J. T.
Hughes, Doniphan's Expedition 139 et seq. The same may be found in various secondary works such as those of Bancroft, Prince, Read, etc. Local tradition holds
that Mme. Tules the noted gambler who went to Santa Fe from Taos was the one
who gave the information regarding the uprising to Colonel Price.
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The wide extent of the rebellion leads on~ to doubt
the reported willingness with which the New Mexicans had
hailed the change in their government. One is led to believe·
that while the bonds which united New Mexico to the central government were very weak, there was not unqualified
approval of the annexation of the province to the United
States. Because of its distance from Mexico, which prevented any efficient protection being extended to this outlying province, a strong spirit of real independence and selfreliance had developed among the inhabitants. One evidence of this is ;found in the successful opposition to the
repeatedly attempted imposition of the "estanquillas" or
the monopoly by the general government of the sale of
tobacco. Had the American government shown its ability
to bestow on New Mexico wha~ the Mexican government
never could-.,...stability of government, safety of property
and personal rights together with protection from the hostile Indians, there can be no doubt that the change of authority would have been gladly received. 33 Such assurance, as
we have seen, had not yet been given. The revolt and discontent also bear evidence against Mr. Dickinson of New
York who, speaking in the Senate in 1848 on the justice of
the Mexican War and of our acquisition of all of Mexico
said ... "But whatever· may be our policy touching Mexican
conquests we cannot, if we would, restore New Mexico and
California to that government, for the reason that they will
not be restored. . . . As well return to Great Britain what
was once her colonial possessions; give back Louisiana to
France, Florida to Spain; Texas to Mexico."34
Colonel Price was at once apprised of the revolt.
Through intercepted letters of the rebels, he learned that
an appeal for aid was being made by the insurgents to the
people of the south; that their army was marching toward
Santa Fe; that their numbers were being constantly aug33. Wislizenus, A., Memoir of a Tour to Northern Mexico.
30. Cong., 1 Sess.)
34. Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 158.

(Sen. Mis. Doc. 26.
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mented by inhabitants of the settlements through which
they passed. 35
An immediate suppression of the uprising was de.termined upon. Although the inclemency of the weather
and a recent heavy snow rendered military movements
difficult, the American troops succeeded, after encounters
at La Canada and EI Embudo, in forcing the insurgents to
retreat toward Taos.36 The bravery of the volunteers won
from Colonel Price the highest praise.
At the Pueblo of Taos the Mexican and Iridian forces
were found firmly intrenched behind the adobe walls which
seemed impervious to artillery fire. After an assault lasting
over two hours, the American soldiers were withdrawn for
the night. On the next day the stubborn resistance was
finally overcome, and at nightfall the soldiers entered the
town which formally surrendered on the following morning. 37
Other rebellions were being crushed at the same time at
smaller centres, particularly the village of Mora. An uprising at Las Vegas was prevented by the loyalty of the alcalde
and his advisers. By the repeated successes of the American arms, law and order were at length reestablished. The
ringleaders of the uprising, fifteen in all, were executed. 38
Others who were accused of complicity in the plot to
overthrow the American power were tried in the civil court
and convicted of treason.· Antonio Maria Trujillo, now an
old man, was sentenced to death. This'sentence was later
'reviewed, and Trujillo pardoned~39 The defendants held that
treason could not be imputed to Mexican, citizens until a
definite treaty of peace was signed between Mexico and the
United States. The report of the trial of Trujillo caused
25. Copy of Official Report of Colonel Price in Nile8 Register, 72, P.' 121; Donaciano Vigil to Sec. of State, J. Buchanan, Ho. Ea:. Doc. 70, 30 Cong., 1, Sess., pp.
19-20:
Hughes, Doniphan's Ea:pedition, 140.
37. Price, op. cit. 122; Garrard, L. H., Wah-to-Yah and the Tao8 Trail, 212-215.
Hughes, op. cit., 141; Prince, L. B., Historical Sketche8 oj New Mea:ico, 325.
39. Bancroft, H. H.; Arizona and New Mea:ico, 436.

36.
38.
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Congress to pass a resolution calling upon the President to
give information as to whether anyone had been tried and
condemned for treason against the United States iIi the
newly conquered regions and if so, un,der what authority
this tribunal had been established. 40 '
,
The request of District Attorney, Frank P. Blair, appointed by General Kearny, for Instructions as to, what
course to follow in view of the charge of lack of jurisdiction, brought forth the following significant reply from the
Secretary of War, Marcy:
The territory conquered by our arms does not
become, by the mere act of conquest, a permanent
part of the United States, and the inhabitants of
such territory are not to the full extent of the term,
citizens of the United States. It is beyond dispute
that, on the establishment of a temporary civil
government in a conquered country, the inhabitants owe obedience to it, and are bound by the
laws which may be adopted; They may be tried
and punished for offences. Those in New Mexico,
who in the late insurrection were guilty of murder,
or instigated others to that crime were liable to
be punished for these acts, either by the civil or
military authority; but it is not the proper use of
the technical term to say that their offence was
treason committed against the United States; for
to the government of the United States, as the government under our constitution it would not, be
correct to say that they owed allegiance. It appears by the letter of Mr. Blair that those engaged in the insurrection have been proceeded
against as traitors to the United States. In this
respect I think there was an error so far as relates
to the designation of the offence. Their offence
was against the temporary civil government' of
New Mexico and the laws provided for it" which
that government had the right and indeed was
bound to see enforced.... You will I trust excuse
an allusion to another subject not officially before
me; I mean the state of discipline, among our
40.

Twitchell, R. E., The Milita11l' Occupation .of' New Meo:ico. 143-4.
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troops at Santa Fe. Though I am far from giving
credence to the newspaper accounts in relation to
it, they ought not to pass entirely unnoticed and
may be permitted to prompt a caution on that
point.
As commanding officer you cannot err in enforcing the most rigid rules of discipline. 41

The uprising had shown the need of increased vigilance
which was maintained during the remainder of the year. 42
The slightest indication of rebellion was carefully noted
and suppressed. After a few weak attempts at insurrection, peace was once more assured but with increased dissatisfaction and distrust on both sides.43
The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. While these problems were being worked out in New Mexico the unqualified
success of the American arms in the various quarters in
which the war was being carried on, culminating in the
occupation of Mexico City by General Scott, finally forced
the Mexican government to sue for peace. The treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo drawn up on February 2, 1848, and
formally ratified at Queretaro on May 30, closed the war of
which both sides, particularly the United States, had
become weary.44
Notwithstanding the popular opposition to a prolongation of the war, the treaty as presented by our discredited
minister, Trist, was subjected to lengthy criticism and hot
debate in the Senate. Some were opposed to any extension
of territory "and the incorporation of the vast population
which seemed incapable of incorporation;" others, whose
expansion ideas were even more progressive than Polk's,
would stop at nothing short of the absorption of all of
Mexico in simple compensation for the claims against
Mexico; while others based their opposition on Trist's lack
of authority to negotiate a peace. Public opinion at length
41.

42.
43.
44.

33-4.

Ho. Ef1!.Doc. 70, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., Pp.
Hughes, op. cit., 142.
See Bancroft, Arizona and New Mezico, 438.

For a good discussion of the various aspects of the treaty see Klein, J., The

Making of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, passim.
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triumphed. By a close vote, thirty-eight to fourteen-a
change of four votes would have reversed the decision-the
treatY was ratified by the Senate.
The opposition to what seemed to Mexico the exorbitant
demands of the victor and a total repudiation of the national
honor was overcome only by the realization that in the
midst of the intestine strife which was then going on, more
favorable terms could not be hoped for if the war were
continued. 45 .
By the terms of the Treaty, the boundaries of the
United States were extended to embrace all the land previously held by Mexico within the present limits of the United
States, with the exception of the small district known as the
Gadsden Purchase territory which was acquired later. Provision was made for the careful marking of the boundary
between
the two countries; the United States made herself
"responsible for the preservation of peace and order among
the border Indian tribes; assumed the debts of Mexico to
American citizens, and agreed to pay to Mexico fifteen
million dollars for the ceded territory. Thus New Mexico
and California became an integral part of the United
States.46 Kearny's work had not been in vain; Polk's aim
was accomplished; the Pacific was our western limit.
45. Klein, OJ). cit., 17-19: Sen. Ez. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 Sess.; Ho. Ez. Doc. 69,
30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 69.
'
46 Ho. Ez. Doc. 69, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 8·3a.

174

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
CHAPTER V
THE INDIAN PROBLEM

The acquisition of the new territory brought to the
United States an important and difficult duty. Within the
confines of the region were numerous Indian tribes for
whose future the federal government was now responsible.
It was apparent from the outset that the plan of action
adopted in New Mexico must have a two-fold aspect, for
here were found two decidedly distinct types of aborigines;
the wild roving tribes· whose names spread terror far and
wide, and the more or less civilized Pueblo Indians.
The Indians of New Mexico. Various estimates have
been given of the number of Indians in New Mexico. The
discrepancies in these accounts prove that they were based
largely on conjecture; but at least they give some indication of the magnitude of the task with which the administrators of government were obliged to cope.
The first report after the American occupation was
that given by Charles Bent, appointed Governor and exofficio Superintendent of Indian Affairs by Kearny. It is
more than probable that this approached as nearly to a
correct estimate as most of the later records, since Bent, as
a resident and trader in New Mexico for many years, had
opportunities to make himself familiar with the true state
of affairs.
He places first in his report the Apaches or JicariIlas 1
whom he describes as a band, 500 in number, of about one
hundred lodges, having no permanent residence but roaming through the northern· settlements of New Mexico; an
indolent cowardly people living principally by th.eft committed on the New Mexicans since there was little game in
the country and their fear of the other Indians prevented
them from. venturing upon the plains for the buffalo. Their
1. "Jicarilla (Mex. Span. 'little basket')-An Athapascan tribe first 80 called
by the Spaniards because of their expertness in making vessels of basketry" (Hodge,
F. W., Handbook· of America,. India'l1.B I, 681).
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only manufacture was a species of pottery capable of resistance .to fire. This they exchanged in very small quantities
with the Mexicans for the necessaries of life. 2
The Apaches proper, according to Bent, ranged through
the southern portion of New Mexico through the country of
the Rio del Norte and its tributaries and westward about
the' headwaters of the river Gila. ' This warlike people of
about nine hundred lodges and from five thousand to six
thousand persons lived almost entirely by plundering the
Mexican settlements, having no knowledge of agriculture
'or manufactures of any kind. The maguey plant which
grew without cultivation in their locality furnished a small
supply of food. The amount of stock which they had successfully carried off from the' Mexican settlements was incredibly large. An effort had been made by the State of
Chihuahua to restrain these marauders by. paying them a
bounty of so much a day per head, but this had not beE!n a
.
success. s
Next in importance were the Navajoes,4 variously estimated at seven thousand to fourteen thousand in number
in from one thousand to two thousand families; "an industrious, intelligent and warlike tribe of Indians who cultivate
the soil and raise sufficient grain for their own consumption
and a variety of fruits." But theIr chief wealth consisted of
flocks and herds. "It is estimated that the tribe possesses
2. Report of Charles Bent in Ho. Ez. Doc. 17, 91 Cong., 1 Sess., PP: 191-194.
This report is the source for this description of the Indians of New Mexico, unless
otherwise stated;
3. "While Mr. Bailey, a special agent to this tribe, agrees with the testimony of
nearly all the people who had any knowledge of them, in pronouncing them the
most bloodthirsty. cruel, and treacherous of all the tribes of this section . . . yet he
differs from the testimony of Gov. Bent and Schoolcraft and asserts that they were
not entirely nomadic, but possessed generally permanent villages in the mountain
valleys north of the Gila where they cultivate the soil to a limited extent and where
their women and children are beyond the reach of attacking parties" (Marsh, R. E.,
The Federal Indian Policy in New Mezico 1845-60, 11).
4. "Fray Alonso Benavides in his Memorial of 1630 gives the earliest translation
of the tribal name in the form Navajo, 'sementras grandes'-'great see4 sowings'
or 'great fields.' The Navajo themselves do not use this name except when trying
to speak English. All do not know it . • • They call themselves Dine which means
simply ·people.' This word as a tribal name is used by nearly every people of the
Athabascan stock."
(Hodge II, 41.)
,
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30,000 head of horned cattle, 500,000 sheep and 10,000 head
of horses, mules and asses, it not being a rare instance for
one individual to possess 5,000 to 10,000 sheep and 400 to
500 head of other stock, and their horses are said to be
greatly superior to those raised by the Mexicans." Most of
their stock had been acquired by depredations on the territory of New Mexico. The Navajo blanket, today so well
known, was at that time their chief manufacture. They
had no permanent villages or places of residence but wandered over a stretch of territory one hundred and fifty
miles in width between the San Juan River on the north and
the Gila on the south. The almost inaccessible table lands
on which they dwelt, where water was scarce and found
with difficulty, afforded them excellent protection against
their enemies whom they successfully plundered for captives in men, women and children, to be employed as slaves.
At the time of the American occupation many were so held. 5
The form of government of the Navajoes made it difficult to deal with them for there was no central authority.
Power in the tribe was usually proportional to wealth and
he who could claim possession of a few head of cattle or
horses demanded a voice in the government. He who did
not' win the approval of the vast majority of the poorer
members of the tribe was apt to find himself divested of all
authority. This condition made it almost impossible to
locate responsibility for crime and properly punish offenders. 6
North of the Navajoes and west of the northern settlements of New Mexico were the Yutahs 7 who, according to
Bent, numbered eight hundred lodges and between four and
five thousand individuals. The mountainous country in
which they dwelt abounded in wild game, deer, elk, and
bear, which served them for food and clothing. A hardy,
warlike people, they subsisted by the chase and carried on a
5.

Bent, op. cit.

6.

Sen. Ex. Doc. 35 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. II, 562.

7.

Ute (Hodge II, 874).
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predatory war in which they took many New Mexicans
captive and drove off large amounts of stock.
These Indians were the most skillful of all the tribes
in New Mexico in the use of firearms. At times some of the
band would work peacefully for the New Mexicans during
the threshing season but their good will could never be
relied upon. 8
Among the other wild tribes described by Bent were
the Cheyennes 9 of three hundred lodges and fifteen hundred
souls, and the Arapahoes, two thousand in number in four
hundred lodges, who ranged through the country of the
Arkansas and its tributaries on the northern part· of New
Mexico. They were on friendly terms with the New Mexicans with whom they carried on a trade in buffalo robes.
East of the mountains of N ~w Mexico were the twelve
thousand Comanches who lived entirely by the chase. These,
too, were at peace with the New Mexicans; but caused terror
in Chihuahua, Durango, and Coahuila, which they successfully invaded for captives and for herds of horses, mules
and asses.
Besides these were the Cayugas whom Bent numbers
as two thousand, similar in customs and habits to the Comanches but considered a braver pe~ple.
But the most interesting of all the Indians described by
Bent were the Moquis,l° one of the Pueblo group. These
neighbors of the Navajoes, numbering three hundred and
fifty families or two thousand four' hundred and fifty
individuals, lived in permanent villages, cultivating grain
and fruit, raising all varieties of stock, and engaging
in the same manufacturing as the Navajoes. They are described as an intelligent, industrious people. Formerly a
very numerous tribe possessing large flocks and herds, at
the time of the coming of the Americans, they, had been
8. Sen. Ea;. Doc. 84, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. I, 377.
9. A large part of this tribe had made permanent headquarters on the Arkansas
immediately after the building of Bent's Fort, in 1832. (Hodge I, 252.)
10. Hopi (Hodge I, 560).
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reduced in numbers and possessions by their warlike neighbor enemies, the Navajoes.
Deducting from the entire number given in this account
five thousand as the probable number of Apaches and
Comanches within the boundaries of Texas, Bent computed
that there were about thirty one thousand nine hundred
Indians in New Mexico. 11
The Pueblo Indians were, without a doubt, the most
important, although their pacific .conduct caused them to be
often overlooked by Washington while efforts were being
made to restrain the marauding tribes. There were twenty
pueblos or villages in New Mexico. In 1849, the Indian
Agent, Calhoun, sent to Col. W. Medill, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, statistics regarding the pueblos, based on
the census ordered by the· Legislature of New Mexico in
1847. He computed that there were in all 6,524,12 Although
in all plans and regulations the Pueblo Indians were treated
as a unit, they were, in reality, spread over an area of two
hundred miles from east to west. Their languages were
quite distinct and few pueblos understood that of others. 13
In order to acquaint the government with the early
history of the Pueblos, the Indian Agent, John Greiner, in
1852 presented to Calhoun, then Governor, important dat~
concerning Spanish arid Mexican laws in their regard.
The first edict on this subject was .that issued by Emperor Charles V, in 1551, and later adopted by Philip II.
This decree recites th~t the principal cause for lively interest
in the natives of the New World was the desire to establish
Christianity... It was therefore resolved "that the Indians
should be brought to settle (reduced to pueblos) and that
they" should not live divided and separated by mountains
and hills, depriving tpemselves of all benefit spiritual and
temporal."
11.
12.
13.

Ro. Eo:. Doc. 76, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., P. 11.
Calhoun, Oct. 4, 1849, op. cit., 89.
Ibid., 497, 40.
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In choosing a site for such a settlement, Philip II ordered that care should be taken to select a healthy place
with abundance of tillable soil, "pasturage for the growth
of flocks, mountains and trees for wood, materials for houses
and other buildings, and water abundant and suitable for
drinking and irrigation ..."
It was also stipulated that definite assignment of land
should be made to each settlement that "the sites on which
pueblos and settlements were to be formed should have
water privileges, lands and mountains, entrances and exits,
farming lands, and a common of a league in extent, where
the Indians might keep their herds without mixing with
those of 'the Spaniards." In 1541, Charles V ordered that
the pastures,' mountains and waters should be common
throughout the Indies.
In order to prevent the infliction of injury on the flocks
or herds of the "reduced" Indians, a law of Philip III in
1618 provided that the grazing lands of large stock should
not be within a league and a half of the old settlements and
those of small stock less than half a league. In the new
settlements the limits were to be twice as great.
To prevent advantage being taken of the ignorance
and trustfulness of the Indians by those who would endeavor to obtain from them the property which had been'
given to them, a law was passed in Mexico in 1781 whereby
it was commanded "That in no case, nor under any pretext
may sales, loans, pawns, rents, nor any other kind of
alienation of Indian lands be executed."14
How faithfully these laws were carried out most probably will never be ascertained. At least in New Mexico the
Indians who wer~ located in pueblos had made much more
progress in the arts of civilization than those who w~re
not, and it seems that their land rights were quite well respected even during the weak Mexican 'administration.
Beginning of Relations between the United' States and
the Indians of the Southwest. The conquest of Santa Fe
14. Ibid., 497-507.
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had scarcely been effected when delegations of many of
the tribes presented themselves to Kearny to show their
willingness to acknowledge the authority of the United
States. Among the first to do so were the Apaches who
glibly promised their allegiance if influence would be exerted in their behalf on their enemies, the Comanches, the
Utes, the Navajoes and the Arapahoes. 15
On his march to California, Kearny received word that
the Navajoes were ravaging the western portion of New
Mexico. According to the promises he had made to the
citizens, he was obliged to protect the attacked. Colonel
Doniphan was therefore ordered against them. With Major
Gilpin and Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson he succeeded in
making a treaty with these "mountain lords and scourges
of New Mexico" who found it difficult to understand why
peace with the Americans should imply peace with the New
Mexicans so lately the enemy of both. 16
Subsequent events proved that in so far as this and
other treaties of similar nature 17 were concerned, the long
wearisome march to the heart of the Indian country was
utterly useless; but it gave some definite ideas of the wealth
of the western tribes in flocks and herds, and some knowledge of the territory inhabited or roamed over by them. It
also proved to the Indians that their mountain fastnesses
were not as inaccessible to the Americans as they had
thought. This had a salutary effect for at least a very brief
space of time.
Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. One of
the most important provisions of the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo was that contained in Article XI which reads:
Considering that a great part of the territories which, by the. present treaty, are to be comprehended for the future within the limits of the
United States is now occupied by savage tribes
who will hereafter be under the exclusive control
15.
15.
17.

Hughes, J. T., DcmipM:":s Erz:pedition, 51.
Ibid., 51-72.
Ho. Erz:. Doc. 5. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 113-115.
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of the government of the United States, and whose
incursions within the territory of Mexico would
be prejudicial in the extreme, it is solemnly agreed
that all such incursions shall be forcibly restrained
by the government of the United States whensoever this may be necessary; and that they shall be .
punished by the same government, and satisfaction
for the same shall be exacted all in the same way,
.and with equal diligence and energy, as if the same
incursions were meditated or committed within
its own territory, against its own citizens.
It shall not be lawful, under any pretext whatever, for any inhabitant of the United States to
'purchase or acquire any Mexican, or any foreigner
residing in Mexico, who may have been captured
by Indians inhabiting the territory of either of the
two republics, nor to purchase or acquire horses,
mules, cattle or property of any kind stolen within
Mexican territory by such Indians.
And in the event of any person or persons
captured within Mexican territory by Indians
being carried into the territory of the United
States, the government of the latter engages and
binds itself, in the most solemn manner, so soon as
it shall know of such captives being within its territory and shall be able to do through the faithful
exercise of its influence and power to rescue them
and return them to their country or deliver them
to the agent or representative of the Mexican government. The Mexican authorities will, as far as
practicable, give to the government of the United
States notice of such captives; and its agent shall
pay the expense incurred in the maintenance and
transmission of the rescued captives, who, in the
meantime shall be treated with the utmost hospitality by the American authorities at the place
where they may be. But if the government of the
United States before receiving such notice from
Mexico should obtain intelligence, through any
other channel, of the existence of Mexican captives
within its territory it will proceed forthwith to
effect their release and delivery to the Mexican
agent as above stipulated. .
For the purpose of giving to these stipulations the fullest possible efficiency thereby afford-
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ing the security and redress demanded by their
true spirit and intent, the government of· the
United States will now and hereafter pass, without unnecessary delay, and always vigilantly enforce,such laws as the nature of the subject may
require. And finally the sacredness of this obligation shall never be lost sight of by the said government when providing for the removal of the
Indians from any portion of the said territories,
or for its being settled by the citizens of the United
States; but on the contrary special care shall be
taken not to place its Indian occupants under the
necessity of seeking new homes by committing
those invasions which the United States have solemnly obliged them to restrain.1s

After prolonged debate in the Senate, this article was
agreed to in its original form except the section which prohibited the furnishing of arms or ammunition to any Indian
by an inhabitant of the United States. Since the Indians
lived by the chase, it was argued that to deprive them· of
firearms would force them to resort to plunder in order to
obtain sustenance. 19
The United States thus took upon herself the three-fold
task of keeping the several Indian tribes at peace with one
another, protecting her own citizens and the adjacent Mexican settlements from their incursions. The. physiography
of the country and its extremes of climate; MexiCan sympathizers residing along the border and within the limits
of the United States; unscrupulous traders and "land grabbers" who had nothing but their own selfish interests as
actuating principles; conflicts between state and federal,
and more especially between civil and military authority;
and lack of any agreement between the United States and
Mexico for reciprocal crossing the border in pursuit of the
ravaging bands, all these factors contributed to render well
18.
19.

Bo. ElI:. Doc. 69, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., PP. 18-20.
Cong .. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 495.
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nigh impossible an overwhelming task even under the most
favorable circumstances.2o
It is so frequently asserted that Mexico showed herself
a very weak, if not stupid administrator in her inability
to protect her distant settlements from the ravages of the
Indians that it is rather surprising to find that little glory
can justly be claimed by the United States because of its
greater successes.
. Events proved that the assurance of Polk, "If New
Mexico were held by the United States we could prevent
these tribes from committing such outrages and compel
them to release the captives and restore them to their families and friends,"~l and the 'confidence of Buchanan that his
government had the will and the power to restrain the wild
tribes,22 were more a hope than a fact.
Conditions in New Mexico After the Conquest. Although politics colored so many of the reports of this period
to such an extent that it is difficult to distinguish the true
from the false, there is more reason to believe than to doubt
that the conditions were worse rather than better after the
. conquest. The St~ Louis Republican declared on November 6, 1847, that Indian depredations in New Mexico had
been more destructive to life and property during the preceding year than at any, other period for twenty years.
This was attributed to the lack of military resistance and
the fact that American traders were allowed to continue to
barter their wares with the Indians who were constantly
outraging the people of New Mexico. 23
On October 4, 1848, the Superintendent of Indian
Affairs had reported that fewer robberies had been committed on the travelers on the Santa Fe trail during that
year than the two previous ones. 24 On February
3, 1849,
.
,

---20.

112-113;
21.
22.
23.
24.

Rippy, J. F., The Relatw'1l8 of the
Calhoun, COTTespondence, passim.
Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p.
Congo Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 495.
Niles RegisteT, Nov. 6, 1847, Vol. 73,
Ho. Ex. Doc. 1., 30 Cong., 2 Sess., p.

United States and Mexico, 1848-1860,
1.
155.
440.
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Colonel Washington communicated to the War Department
that there were indications that the wild tribes in the outlying regions "were becoming convinced that they must
restrain themselves within prescribed limits and cultivate
the earth for an honest livelihood or be destroyed."25
But the Indian Agent Fitzpatrick, through whose district the trail ran, gave an explanation, which later events
bore out, of the seeming submission. He would see no cause
for the cessation of hostilities except that the Indians had
secured so ~uch booty in 1846 and 1847 that they were then
luxuriating in the spoils. He warned against the conclusion
that any real solution of the problem had been reached.
Together with all that were familiar with the true conditions, he asserted that only by an exhibition of real power
could the United States impress upon the savages any
respect for their ability to punish or restrain them. 26
Scarcely had spring arrived when Washington reported
that depredations had begun once more and that some American citizens had been murdered at Taos. The regular
military force had proven entirely inadequate and he had
been obliged to summon a volunteer force which had rendered excellent service. 27 On May 30, there were ten more
murders at the hands of the Apaches to report, and during
the succeeding months the attacks were almost continuous.
The need of a stronger cavalry force was urgently insisted
upon. 28 But Congress was too much occupied with other
problems to give adequate attention to the urgent needs of
the distant territories.
The Indian Agency in Santa Fe. It was patent that the
organization of the Indian Department, provided for in
1834, needed revision in view of the new problems which
naturally resulted from the mere immensity of the recent
territorial acquis.ition. But, since Congress failed to make
the necessary changes, the President and the commissioner
25.
26.
27,
28.

Ho. Ex. Doc. 5, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., P. 105.
Ho. Ex. Doc. I., 30 Cong., 2 Sess., p.
Ho. Ex. Doc. 5, 31 Cong., 1 Sess.• p. 106.
Ibid., 108-10.
.
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of Indian affairs were almost powerless until 1849 when it
was determined, in consonance with the provisions of the
Act of 1834 to move the Indian Agency from Council Bluffs
to Santa Fe.29
James S. Calhoun was appointed first Indian agent for
Santa Fe on April 7, 1849. His acquaintance with the
region, although slight, and, more especially, political influence, were responsible for his appointment. "... he proved
himself a thoroughly capable and honest official. Not a
single scandal, not a single suspicion of peculation tarnished
his record, and in his time, at least, that was a singularly
rare experience in the United States Indian service."30
The office was to be no sinecure. No specific instructions could be given since practically nothing definite was
known by the Indian Office of conditions in New Mexico.31
Calhoun was instructed that he was depended. upon to
furnish .
. . . such statistical and other information as will
give a just and full understanding of every particular relating to them, embracing the names of
the tribes, their location, the distance between the
tribes, the probable extent of territory owned or
29. Calhoun, J. S., Official Correspondence, 1. "The Act of June 30, 1834 was
'An Act to Provide for the organization of the Department of Indian Affairs' and its
4th section reads as follows: '. . . And the President shall be and he is authorized,
whenever he may judge it expedient, to discontinue any Indian Agency or to transfer
the same, from the place or tribe designated by law, to such other place or tribe as
the public service may require.' . . . Under existing law, the number of agencies was
limited but that of sub-agencies unlimited. There were two Council Bluffs Indian
establishments, 8 Bub-agency on the Iowa side of the Missouri River, accommodating
the 'united nations of Chippewas, Ottawa and Pottawatomie Indians' and an agency
on the Nebraska side at Bellevue, accommodating the Otoes and Missourias, the
Pawnees and the Omahas. Under the provisions of the Treaty of 1846 . . : the
United nation of Chippewa. Ottawa, and Pottawatomie Indians agreed 'to remove to
their new homes on the Kansas River, within two years from the ratification of the
treaty.' This discontinued the 'Council Bluffs Sub-Agency' and made it possible for
the Indian Office to meet the new needs of the Southwest by reducing the 'Council
Bluffs Agency' to a sub-Agency and, that done, completing the number of agencies
by erecting one at Santa Fe:' (Idem.)
30. Calhoun, J. S., Official Correspondence, xii-xiii, 3.
31. The Dept. of the Interior was created March 3, 1849, and the Office of Indian
Affairs had been transferred as a bureau to it from the War Dept. Thomas Ewing
·whose family was interested in the Santa Fe trade was appointed first Secretary of
the Department of the Interior (Ibid., 9, 10).
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claimed· by each respectively and the tenure. by
which they hold or claim it; their manners and
habits, their disposition and feelings towards the
United States, Mexico and the whites generally
and towards each other, whether hostile or otherwise; whether the several tribes speak different ,
languages, and when different the apparent analogies between them, and also what laws and regulations for their government are necessary and
how the law regulating trade and intercourse
with the Indian tribes . . . will, if extended over
that country, properly apply to the Indians there
and to the trade and intercourse with them and
what modification, if any, will be required to produce the greatest degree of efficiency.32

He was, moreover,' instructed to use every possible
means to obtain information regarding any Americans or
Mexicans held captive, and if Mexican, whether their capture was prior or subsequent to the signing of the recent
treaty. Evidently these last circumstances would affect the
obligations of the United States. 33
Calhoun undertook his duties at once, reaching Santa
Fe July 22, 1849. 34 His voluminous correspondence reveals
his intense interest in his new field of labor and his untiring
efforts to have his suggestions acted upon by the federal
government. In his first report he endeavored to give as
accurate information regarding the Indian conditions as the
short time he had been in New Mexico allowed. He advocated a conciliatory policy toward the Pueblo Indians whom
he described as amicably disposed toward Americans, industrious and anxious to make progress. Toward the wild,
roving tribes who had wrought havoc on all sides he advised sternness, in order to prove the power of the United
States, and thus elicit respect, followed by generosity
towards those who sought peace. He especially recommended an early consideration by Congress of the problem
82. Calhoun. Correspondence. 3.
83. Ibid.• 4.
84. Ibid., 17.
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presented by those tribes which had never learned to support themselves except by plunder.35
In the latter part of 1849 he summarized the suggestions he had made up to that date. He specifically recommended the appointment of agents at various points.
Their presence is demanded by every principle
of humanity, by every generous obligation of kindness, of protection, and of good government
throughout this vast Territory. These agents ...
should be selected, not only with regard to their
prudence and discretion, but with a view to the
proper training of the Pueblo Indians in the efficient use of our arms....
By keeping up a proper line of communication
between the pueblos and other places in this Territory, it will be no difficult matter to intercept
roving bands of robbers, no matter what their
color may be so soon as it is ascertained from what
quarter they proceed; and that may be done unerringly by an examinatiori of their trai1. 36 .
With the suggestions he sent a diagram to show the
basis of his decision. 37 He suggested:
1st. The establishing of a full agency at Taos, or
near that place,for the Utahs, and Pueblos of that
neighborhood.
\
2nd. Also a full agency at and for Zunia, and the
Navajoes.
3rd. A full agency at Socoro, a military post south
of Albuquerque, now being established. The· ag~nt
of this place t.o look after the Apaches and Comanches, and the pueblo of Isletta, north. Subagents should be sent to San Ildefonso, or near
there; to Jemez, Laguna, and at the military post
near EI Paso.
These agents and sub-agents are absolutely
necessary to an economical administration· of our
Indian affairs in this Territory. It is my honest
35. Ibid., 18·20.
36. Ho. Ex. Doc. 17, 31 Cong., 1 Bess., 223-4.
87. Idem.
.
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opinion that for the ensuing year, at least, a subagent should be in every pueblo, the whole to be
under the direction of a general superintendent ...38

As time wore on, Calhoun began to realize more fully
the magnitude of the task before him. But he felt himself
equal to the situation if only adequate means were furnished by the federal government to meet the enormous
expenditure necessarily incurred in New Mexico where
prices were much higher than in the eastern states; if
proper agencies were established; and if a strong military
force were allowed for the territory or he were authorized
to raise a volunteer force. The latter plan he considered
the better. 39
For three years he labored at a task which should
have met with hearty cooperation, but, in reality, was almost
ignored by Congress. His correspondence reveals, as nothing else could, the true state of affairs. On November 30,
1849, he wrote, "Matters in this territory are in a most deplorable condition, infinitely worse than you can imagine
them, and which, without being an eye witness you cannot
realize."40 Traveling on the Santa Fe Trail was most·hazardous; murders and depredations were of frequent occurrence; among those killed was a well known Mr. White
whose wife and child were taken captive; the mail had
been robbed; treaties were ignored; the government in the
territory was inefficient; Colonel Munroe's refusal to keep
Calhoun advised of his plans for suppressive measures by
the military complicated affairs; American traders were
exerting an evil influence; and Americans travelling through
the Pueblo country had been guilty of outrageous conduct
which had engendered a bitter feeling in these trustful
people.41
38.
39.
40.
41.
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But Calhoun had more than complaints to offer. His
suggestions were carefully planned to meet the exigencies
of the situation. On January 15, 1850 he reported, "The
trade and intercourse with the Apaches alid Comanches by
Mexicans, Americans, and· Pueblo Indians, is rapidly increasing and until this is checked we cannot hope for the
slightest improvement in our affairs.
1. Let the laws regulating trade, etc., be extended
over these tribes at once.
2. Each tribe should have fixed limits assigned to
them, and there compelled to remain, though
the United States Government should have to
support them for a time.
3. The laws of No.1 should be extended over the
Pueblos, and they divided in such a way as to
give to each district an Agent and each pueblo·
for this year should have a sub-agent.
4. These Agents should have Ordnance and Ordnance Stores to be used as occasion may require.
5. It is my decided opinion it would be the best
possible economy to send out two mounted regiments for service here-without them you can':'
not keep the Indians in the limits you may
assign them, nor can you preverit an illicit trade
and intercourse and the people of this territory
must neither expect safety to their persons or
property.

A few Indians ought to be called to Washington."42
The last suggestion was the one of the necessity of
which Calhoun was evidently thoroughly convinced. He
thought that by this means the Indians would be impressed
with a true idea of the power of the United States for which
they had little respect. He had reported in 1849 that
". . . the wild Indians of this country have been so much
more successful in their robberies since General Kearny
took possession of the country, they do not believe we have
the power to chastise them." There are few so bold as to
42.
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travel alone ten miles .from" Santa Fe. 43 Thus the American
population was decreasing. Many went to California or
returned east.44
Some treaties with the Indians, notably those with the
Navajoes and Utahs, had been entered into, but, like too
many others, might just as well not have been drawn up.
They did, however, give the two peoples an opportunity to
come into close contact and thus revealed to the Americans
characteristics of the Indians as well as the nature and
extent of the territory. This information was found useful
in determining the future policy.
Calhoun certainly used all the means at his command
to comply with the terms of the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo. He, had succeeded to a limited extent in accomplishing the provision regarding the liberation and return
of captives. On at least three occasions he had such reports
to make. On June 27, 1850, thirteen Mexican captives were
confided to Jose M. Prieto at El Paso, five more were delivered in the same place on August 5, 1851, and later in the
same month three others were being held awaiting the disposal of their government. 45
But he repeatedly warned Washington that claims
would undoubtedly be brought against the United States by
Mexico for depredations committed along the border by the
Indians who travelled with impunity from one side of the
line to the other. To the argument that the expenses of the
War Department must be cut down and therefore no more
troops could be apportioned to New Mexico, he replied that
a decisive show of strength would effectively put a stop to
.the possibility of plunder and the amount expended would
be much less than the United States was making herself
liable for.
By forcing the Indians to remain within prescribed
bounds, the end would be gained. Besides preventing the
43.
44.

Ibid., 31, 32.
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45. Calhoun, op. cit., 390, 401, 427.
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depredations on the Mexican as well as American popula,tion, this line of action would render protection to the
Pueblo Indians who were becoming more and more dissatisfied with the conditions under American, rule. Under both
Spain and Mexico they had been allowed to protect themselves from the inroads of the wild tribes, particularly the
Navajoes, by retaliatory raids. Now this was forbidden
them and they· found themselves practically helpless.
Neither they nor the Mexicans could understand the propriety of the government at Washington refusing to allow
them to take vengeance on their aggressors' when it was
evident that it could not protect them, unless it was the intention of this government to make good their losses from
its own treasury. They repeatedly demanded arms and
ammunition. 46
Another source of grievance was the assumption of
power. in the pueblos by the alcaldes who now found it
possible to rule in a most arbitrary fashion. Under the·
Mexican domination they had exercised practically selfgovernment and were naturally opposed to its abrogation.
Furthermore their property rights were being questioned
by' both American and Mexican claimants to land within
the pueblos.47
Calhoun soon realized that. the intercourse of traders
with the Indians, particularly the Pueblos, required strict
and careful regulation. Their influence against the Indian
agency was constantly being manifested. Through the
traders the wild tribes obtained arms with which to nullify
the exertions of Calhoun. They worked on the fears of the
Pueblos by representing the weakness of the United States
and the certainty of the restoration of Mexican power which
would result in the extermination of those Indians who had
consented to the American rule. Their motive for this disgraceful course of action was the desire to exclude other
Americans from the Pueblo lands in which they were mak46.
47.
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ing a fortune by their bartering. The extent of the influence
of the traders was manifested by their traveling with impunity through those regions in which the most hostile tribes
dweIt.48
Definite but ineffectual efforts were made to regulate
this traffic. On November 21, 1849, Calhoun was authorized by Governor Munroe to issue a notice regarding
traders' licenses. Each applicant was obliged to give bond,
not to exceed five thousand dollars, that he would not violate
the general laws of the United States governing intercourse
with the Indians and would not trade in implements of war.
Licenses would authorize trading with a specific tribe and
with no others. Permits for trade with the Apaches, Navajoes, and Utahs were for the time refused. 49
To anyone conversant with the failure of the United
States to enforce trade laws with the Indians throughout
the entire west during these years, it is not surprising to
find that these regulations of Calhoun were successfully
evaded and the evil continued to as great an extent as
before.
The very distance of New Mexico from the center of
goyernment and the difficulty of intercommunication between the two places increased the magnitude of problems
of control. Much of the mail was lost and that which escaped the Indian raids, reached its destination only after a
long delay. Thus often no authorization for a suggested
course of action could be given to Calhoun whose powers
were very limited, until the need of such action was passed.
The Indian Problem in Congress. By the close of the
year 1849, practically nothing had been accomplished by the
federal government except the establishment of an agency
at Santa Fe. The good which this had been able to do could
be attributed to the untiring efforts of the person who filled
the office, rather than to any definite policy on the part of
the United States, or, apparently, any lively interest in
48.
49.
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what was going on., Although partially due to ignorance of
the true state of affairs, this indifference can also be traced
to the absorbing nature of other problems with which the
United States had to cope at the time and the successful
blocking of legislation by the opponents of the administration.
The same was true in 1850 although at the close of the
year Calhoun was appointed governor of the newly organized territory. This gave him more authority although disputes with the military power, represented by Sumner,
were more pronounced than during the administration of
Munroe who, though not always in sympathy with Calhoun's plans, did render effective assistance on many
occasions. 50
In January 1851, the commissioner of Indian affairs
reported to CaJhoun that with the exception of the report
of the committee of Ways and Means recommending an
appropriation of $36,000 for fulfilling the treaties of 1849
with the Navajoes and Utahs, no action had been taken by
Congress in reference to Indian Affairs in New Mexico. 51
Perhaps no peoples in the territory suffered more than
the Pueblo Indians, yet Calhoun could report in 1849 that
they were the only Indians in complete friendship with the
government of the United States. He described them as "an
industrious, agricultural and pastoral people living principally in villages ... on both sides of the Rio Grande."52
In the "gold rush" to California many adventurers
followed the road which passed by the Pueblo of Zuni about
two hundred miles from Santa Fe. These Indians were harassed by the Navajoes and Apaches but "what is shockingly
discreditable to the American name, emigrants commit the
greatest wrongs against these excellent Indians, by taking,
in the name of the United States, such horses, mules, and
sheep, and grain as they desire, carefully concealing their
50.
51.
52.
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true name, but assuming official authority and bearing."
The same, if not greater, wrongs were suffered by the Indians of Laguna. 53
Calhoun repeatedly reported that neglect of· the Pueblo
Indians, exposing· them to attacks which they' were not
allowed to repel with their own forces because they were
presumably under the protection of the United States, was
not only unjust b.ut also impolitic. They would make willing
and useful allies in warfare with the roving bands of Indians. They could also supply the many necessary articles
of food if their industries were protected~ "These people
can raise immense quantities of corn and wheat, and have
large herds of sheep and goats-the grazing for cattle generally is superiot."54
Yet almost every letter from Calhoun recites the continuance of unrest and dissatisfaction. Having been promised protection, the Pueblos could not understand why it
was not accorded to them.
That the opinions of Calhoun were based on facts is
proven by the report of L. Lea, the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs in 1850 to the Secretary of the Interior.
The ruinous condition of our Indian affairs in
New Mexico demands the immediate attention of
Congress. In no section of the country are prompt
and efficient measures for restraining the Indians
more imperiously required than in this territory,
. where an extraordinary. state of things exists,
which so long as it continues, will be a reproach to
the government.
There are over ·30,000 Indians within its
limits, the greater portion of which, having never
been subjected to any salutary restraint are extremely wild and intractable. For many years
they have been in the habit of making forays, not
only within the Territory itself, but in the adjoining provinces of Mexico ... Our citizens have suffered severely from their outrages within the last
two years ... Atrocities and aggressions are com53. Ibid., 30-31, 43.
54. Ibid., . 40, 53
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mitted not only upon our citizens but upon Pueblo
Indians.... Before the country came into our possession, they were in. the habit of repairing the
injuries they sU'stained by retaliation and reprisals
upon their enemies; but from this they are required to desist; and thus the duty is more strongly
imposed upon us of affording them adequate protection. The interference of the government is required also to' secure them against violations of
their rights of persons and property by unprincipled white men, from whose cupidity and lawlessness they are continually subject to grievous
annoyance and ·oppression..
. . . It is beli~ved that by pursuing a wise and
liberal policy toward them ... they will in a few
years be fitted to become citizens; and being indus:"
trious, moral, and exemplary, in their habits will
constitute a valuable portion of the population of
the territory.51l
On February 27, 1851, an appropriation was made for
four Indian agents for New Mexico and one for Utah ;56
but little more was done by the federal governme~t.
The responsibility for this inertia cannot be laid to the
charge of the administration. The conditions on the frontier formed a vital part of President Fillmore's message of
December 1850. The President called the attention of Congress to the deplorable state of affairs and reminded the
members of our treaty obligations to Mexico which were not
being fulfilled.57
Any effort to obtain an appropriation for the proper
management of the Indians which meant an increase in the
army brought forth discussions on the responsibility for
the Mexican War or other party issues; and the Committee
on Ways and Means was inclined to cut down the estimates
sent in by the War Department.
Criticism of the expense of maintaining the army considered so extravagant in peace times was heard on all sides.
55. Se... E.,. Doc. I, 81 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 42.
56. RipPli. op. cit.. 118.
57. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the President V. 87.
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The answer was always the same. We had taken the burden on ourselves by the treaty and moreover, less would be
required to convince the Indians of the power of the United
States than would later be necessary to subdue them when
a real war, which could be expected daily, should break
out. 58 Some would even return the newly acquired land
to Mexico and even give her a few millions to take it back. 59
Later it was solemnly suggested by the Secretary of War
that all the land be bought from the inhabitants and they be
given land elsewhere since it was not from any viewpoint
worth the money which was being spent. The Indians could
then be left in undisputed possession: so
Still nothing decisive was done and conditions in New
Mexico daily became worse. On July 9, 1851, Governor Calhoun received a memorial from the people of Santa Fe setting forth the lamentable state of the country since the
American occupation. In order to show the unqualified
necessity of raising a volunteer force composed of the people
of New Mexico to protect their own lives and property, the
statement was made
... at the present time New Mexico does not
possess one tenth of the property she owned in the
previous years; it has been' swept away as by an
impetuous torrent, our prosperity has' been converted into misfortune and the present miserable
condition of New Mexico is the fatal result of the
misfortune which has taken _place paralyzing
every branch of industry to the greatest degree
and being the cause' of continued murders and the
taking of nearly all the property owned in New
Mexico. s1
Finally in August 1852, $20,000 were appropriated for
general Indian service in New Mexico and the general
appropriation bill set aside $65,000 for the segregation of
the Indians according to the early suggestions of Calhoun.
58. Congo Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 689, 721 et. seq.
59. -Congo Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 1052-1063.
SO. Congo Globe. App. 32 Cong., 2 Sess., 103 et seq.
61. Calhoun, op. cit., 386.
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But this was a paltry sum in view of the expense of patrol,.
ling the frontier and though conditions were somewhat
improved in New Mexico during the next year, the Indians
were causing greater havoc than ever on the Mexican side
of the boundary.62
The Indian agents who had been appointed made con;'
siderable effort to ,meet the qbligations of the treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Before December 30, 1853, when the
Gadsden Treaty changed the responsibility completely, four
important Indian treaties were made, threE;l of which were
ratified by Congress. Each provided that the Indians should
deliver up Mexican prisoners. The treaty with the Gila
Apaches, even went so far as to pledge the Indians in future
to desist from making hostile or predatory incu~sions into
Mexico. It is well known that these Indians had nume~ou's
Mexican prisoners and it is safe to assume that after the
signing of the treaty these were returned to their homes.
Something, then, had been accomplished by the agents notwithstanding the difficuty of their task.63
The Indian Policy of Mexico., There is no foundation
in fact for the assumption that, Mexico made no attempts
to, defend herself from the Indians during this, time, and
refus~d to cooperate with the efforts, such as they,' were,
of the United States. 64
immediately after the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,
the northern frontier was marked out into three divisions,
the ,Frontier of the East, the Frontier of ChihuaJlUa, and
the Frontier of the, West. Among these eighteen colonies
were distributed. Generous offers were made to those who
would second the efforts of the Government to make settlements on the boundary. The land around each colony,
after being improved at government expense, was to be
assigned to the soldiers for, cultivation. During his terms of
service~ the soldier, recruited by voluntary enlistment for
'62.
63,
64.
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a term of six years, was to share the fruits of the soil, and
at the expiration of his term was to receive a bounty of ten
pesos and the allotment of land which he had been cultivating. Provision was also made for civilian settlers around
each colony which, on reaching a certain population, was
to be given a civil government.
In the course of the next four years all the colonies were
set up either permanently or temporarily. Soldiers had
been recruited, and by treaties in 1850 and 1852 with peaceful Seminoles and Muskogees, they had been permitted to
settle in the vicinity of the colonies of the East and Chihuahua; in 1851 reduced Sierra Gorda IndIans were sent to
increase the frontier forces.
The towns on the frontier exposed to the Indian raids
formed leagues for common defense, and private individuals
contributed to war and ransom funds. Finally the frontier
states of Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Zacatecas, Tamaulipas,
and San Luis Potosi (1851) began plans for union for the
purpose of self-defense.
That these measures were ineffective was due to the
internal dissensions in Mexico, "the chaotic state· of the
national funds, the poverty of the frontier states; epidemics
of cholera and fever, the quest for gold which drew a large
number of Sonorans annually to California, and lastly by
the filibusterers who, beginning their raids in 1851, kept
the whole northern frontier in almost constant a~itation."65
Numerous complaints were made by Mexico on account
of the failure of the United States to fulfill the obligations
imposed by Article Xl of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.
In March 1850, De la Rosa, the Mexican Minister at Washington, represented that the only advantage which could
"compensate Mexico for the many sacrifices" which the
late treaty "rendered necessary" was the exact fulfillment
of the stipulations in regard to the Indians. Early in January, 1852, the Mexican Minister of Relations, Ramirez,
demanded that "in virtue of this obligation-contracted and
65.
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not fulfilled-means should be devised to indemnify Mexico for the fatal consequences" which had resulted.
The United States Government held that it was not
liable for damages inflicted by the Indians but that it was
only obliged to exact the same satisfaction fr.om the savages
for raids into Mexico as if these had been against the United
States. Reports that Mexico was preparing to present
heavy claims and that speculators were buying up these
claims caused efforts to be made to obtain release from the
Article which it was' now seen to be practically impossible
to fulfill. The complete story of the efforts made by thlil
United States to obtain this release has never been told, but
it is known that the attempts made during the latter part of
1851 to gain this end by a payment of some six or seven
million dollars were failures.
The border Indian problem, then,' served as one of the
many incentives to the United States to endeavor to bring
about a satisfactory adjustment of the strained relations
between herself and Mexico. That this was, achieved,
through the Gadsden Treaty has already been noted. The
greatest gain to the United States was the abrogation of
Article XI of the former treaty. The Indian situation
thereby lost its international character but did not cease' to
be one of the most difficult problems with which the United
States was obliged to cope in the Southwest. The account
of how satisfactory control was finally effected belongs to
the later history of the United States.

